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In 2004, Oregon voters approved Measure 37. Measure 37 pro-
vided that "governments must pay owners, or forgo enforcement,
when certain land use restrictions reduce property value. 2 In 2005,
Judge Mary James ruled that the measure was illegal.s On appeal,4
the Oregon Supreme Court reversedJudge James's ruling, reinstating
the law. While Judge James's ruling was short-lived, it embraced an
interesting argument about the government's scope of power in re-
stricting property rights.
Oregon's land-use regulations immediately before 2004 forced lo-
cal governments to set clear boundaries between urban and rural
lands, and to constrain development to the former. Some argued
that such restrictions were a taking in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Measure 37 reflected their position and forced local govern-
. J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., 2004, University of Chi-
cago. Special thanks to Professors Wendell Pritchett and Kristin Madison for their guidance in
writing and editing this Comment, and to Matt Mills and all the editors of the Journal of Constitu-
tional Law for their assistance in editing and revising this Comment. All mistakes are my own.
See November 2, 2004, General Election Abstract of Votes: State Measure No. 37,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/abstract/m37.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2006)
(approving the measure by 1,054,589 votes to 685,079). Measure 37 was codified at OR. REV.
STAT. § 197.352. However, this Comment reflects common parlance and refers to claims under
the law as Measure 37 claims.
2 1 SEC'Y OF STATE, STATE OF OR., VOTERS' PAMPHLET: STATE MEAsURES 103 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/pdf/vpvoll.pdf (original text is
all capital letters).
3 See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., No. 00C15769, slip op. at 14-15 (Or. Ct. App.
Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/macpherson-opinion.pdf
("Measure 37 violates the privileges and immunities clause of Article I, § 20, of the Oregon
Constitution, because it does not serve a legitimate state interest, and in any event, the means
chosen to serve the state's interest are not rationally related to that interest.").
4 See Laura Oppenheimer, Oregon Supreme Court Will Hear Measure 37 Appeal in January,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 9, 2005, at B5.
5 See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 322 (Or. 2006) (concluding that
Measure 37 violates neither the Oregon Constitution nor the Federal Constitution); see also
Laura Oppenheimer, Measure 37 Will Be Law Again Monday, OREGONIAN, Mar. 11, 2006, at E7.
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ments to compensate for any diminution in land value resulting from
regulation. This Comment explains why this position in support of
Measure 37 is a misconception and why the development scheme in
Oregon did not amount to a taking.
The opponents of the measure also looked to the Constitution to
argue that the new law should be invalidated by the courts. They
claimed that the results of the measure-exempting their neighbors
from long-standing property restrictions-removed some of their
property rights. Taking a slightly different angle, they claimed that
the interference with property rights was happening without their
having due process. However, the implication was that a taking oc-
curred. This Comment also explains why the opponents of the meas-
ure were wrong to look to the Constitution to invalidate the new law.
The specifics of this constitutional misunderstanding aside, this
Comment argues that, stepping back from the fray, one can observe
the interplay of property, liability, and inalienability rules in the un-
derlying land-use debate. The measure's effect was to remove an in-
alienability rule from the regulatory scheme. This Comment explains
that no other inalienability rules-specifically constitutional protec-
tions-prevent that modification. However, this Comment also ar-
gues that this type of regulation is precisely the circumstance where
governments should, as a policy matter, (re)implement inalienability
schemes to prevent uncoordinated metropolitan growth.
Part II discusses Oregon's unique history of land-use planning
regulations. Part III examines relevant constitutional law and how
that law bears on the presence or absence of an urban growth
boundary. Part IV examines the underlying scheme of property, li-
ability, and inalienability rules at play and makes the policy argument
that an inalienability rule is appropriate in this circumstance.
II. MEASURE 37 IN CONTEXT6
The history of land-use planning in Oregon is relevant to under-
stand the foundation of the present-day debate between proponents
and opponents of Measure 37.
6 This Comment's historical account mainly concerns itself with the generation that
launched current land-use restrictions, as they are most relevant to the political climate. In
some respects, the contrast I describe between the aspirations vis-h-vis the public good in the
second half of the twentieth century and the vector on which voters aligned themselves in 2004
may be more of a reversion. See William G. Robbins, In Search of Western Lands, in LAND IN THE
AMERICAN WEST: PRIVATE CLAIMS AND THE COMMON GOOD 3, 7 (William G. Robbins & James C.
Foster eds., 2000) ("Until late in the nineteenth century... the function of federal land policy
[in the West generally, and in Oregon specifically,] was the orderly distribution of public lands
to private ownership. Land, after all, was the great temptation to those who conceived of prop-
erty, security, and status in terms of landed real estate.").
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A. The Genesis of Land-Use Regulation in Oregon
In 1979, Oregon voters authorized the creation of a metropolitan
service district.7 "Metro" would be the planning arm to ensure com-
pliance with Oregon's statewide planning goals. Those goals were
initially approved by the legislature in 1973 when they codified Ore-
gon Revised Statutes Section 197.005, the Comprehensive Land Use
Planning Coordination Act, requiring metropolitan areas to enact
smart growth policies.
Oregon in the early 1970s was at an awkward stage of its develop-
ment, both excited by its emerging prominence and wary of an influx
of newcomers.8 In 1971, then Governor Tom McCall famously de-
clared: "Come and visit [Oregon] again and again. But for heaven's
sake, don't come here to live."" Two years later the New York Times
spotlighted the comment, criticizing McCall for giving Oregon a
negative reputation and discouraging businesses from moving to the
state. 10 In many respects, this tension has never subsided: Oregon
headquarters two of the largest athletic shoe companies in the world
as well as several technological innovators," yet its restrictive land-use
policies heavily constrain expansion of its metropolitan area.
The history of Portland-area urban freeways gives an instructive
perspective on the city's unique approach to land use. Like most
metropolitan areas in the 1970s, Portland intended to use funds from
federal transportation subsidies to extend its freeway network to ex-
pand its metropolitan area." Portland had even begun purchasing
homes in the southeastern quadrant of the city to ease the implemen-
tation of the plan. However, community activists in Portland
launched a successful campaign to block the freeway, insisting that
7 See AM. PLANNING ASS'N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES FOR
PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 6-7 to -11, 6-15, 6-26, 6-100 to -104 (phases I & II,
interim ed. 1998), reprinted in LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 486, 489 (Gerald E. Frug et al. eds., 3d
ed. 2001) (describing the creation of the metropolitan service district known as "Metro").
8 One can make the case that Portland has always been at awkward stages of development.
See Carl Abbott, Urbanism and Environment in Portland's Sense of Place, 66 Y.B. AS'N PAC. COAST
GEOGRAPHERS 120, 122 (2004) ("One of [Portland's] radical virtues.., has been to conserve or
even recreate the best from previous generations of city making while accommodating eco-
nomic and demographic change.").
9 Steven V. Roberts, Some Areas Seek to Halt Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1971, at 1.
10 David Bird, Gov. McCall Seeks to Curb Oregon's Growth, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1973, at 31.
1 See In Some Industries, Portland Area Has Certain Magnetism, in Rethinking Portland, PORTLAND
TRIB., July 25, 2006, at 11 (detailing clusters of business activity in high-tech and active wear,
including Nike and Adidas).
12 This is a different course of action from that chosen by most cities. See PETER DREIER,
JOHN MOLLENKOPF, & TODD SWANSON, PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 92, 92-132 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (discussing pervasive federal subsidization being used to
finance sprawling growth practices).
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the road would benefit suburbanites at the expense of fragmenting
vibrant urban neighborhoods.'
Neil Goldschmidt, then a legal aid lawyer, helped lead the charge,
emphasizing "the importance of strong schools and neighborhoods
in keeping the middle class in a city."" Shortly 1thereafter, Gold-
schmidt centered a successful campaign for mayor on the idea that
the core of a city should not be sacrificed to subsidize outward expan-
sion into the suburbs. 16 This was counter-revolutionary, as it refuted
the post-war conceptualization of the suburb as a cure for urban
13 See infra Part III (arguing at length that the activists' general assertions were valid).
14 Bob Young, Highway to Hell, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Mar. 9, 2005, at 12-13. Young's article
also discusses how the community activists were inspired byJaneJacobs's book, THE DEATH AND
LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (Vintage 1992) (1961). Jacobs's work is regarded as a highly
provocative examination of how cities function and includes a normative examination of how
city planners should respond to that functioning. One account of her work is particularly in-
structive at explaining the impact her writing had on the Porflanders fighting the freeway:
Her neighborhoods are not the areas on street maps that city planners have been forced
to create in order to delineate the boundaries for formal neighborhood consultation.
For her the neighborhood is a place of overlapping networks created by the habits of
nearby residents. Some residents range at some distance, theirs is a large embrace, oth-
ers move just along a single street. The residents' sense of neighborhood is thus an ever-
shifting definition.
The city district is also an amorphous area, something less than a municipality, lar-
ger than a neighborhood. She imagines it as an area where some politician takes on the
role of advocate and deal-maker, someone who can get essential tasks done that the mu-
nicipal bureaucracy is either not doing, or doing poorly.
Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Jane Jacobs's Moral Explorations, 28 B.C. ENvTL. ArF. L. REv. 609, 612
(2001).
15 See Tom Wicker, Mr. Mayor at 31, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1972, at 45 (documenting Gold-
schmidt's opposition to freeways). This is discussed in vivid detail in the story:
The new Mayor regards the problem of the automobile as mortal. "I know they say
the American will never give up his car or his right to drive it when and where he
pleases," he says, "but if that's so the city is dead anyway." This is not only because of
noise, air pollution and traffic jams, he believes, but because the inevitable result of un-
checked auto traffic is freeways.
If an urban freeway destroys or damages a neighborhood, many of its people move
to the suburbs; that means the freeway is often obsolete or overcrowded as soon as it
opens; so more freeways have to be built, which means the destruction of more
neighborhoods; and so on.
Id. Goldschmidt later became the Secretary of Transportation under President Carter. Presi-
dent's Choices For Transportation and HUD. Reported, N.Y. TIMES,July 27, 1979, at Al.
16 SeeYoung, supra note 14 (recounting Goldschmidt's view that it was unfair that "[c]ity resi-
dents would pay [for the freeway], sacrificing their neighborhoods, schools and tax base. Sub-
urban commuters would reap the benefits [of the freeway] with a slightly shorter commute.").
This stance was in some respects deferential to urban planning goals of an earlier time. See, e.g.,
Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183, 183-84
(1997) (reflecting upon colonial urban planning which "emphasize[d] urban community," as
compared with later suburbanization efforts).
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blight. 17 Portland instead earmarked its. highway funds for the con-
struction of a light-rail system. 8
In 1973, the Oregon legislature responded to anti-sprawl senti-
ment by drafting legislation creating "a statewide planning agency to
prescribe planning goals and objectives to be applied by state agen-
cies, cities, counties and special districts throughout the state. ' ' 9
Oregon voters ratified the planning law in the election of 1976.
Then, in 1979, Portland became the first-and, to date, the only-
city governed by a multi-county regional government. Although to
comply with chapter 197 of the Oregon Code all Oregon cities had to
implement growth boundaries and conduct land-use planning for the
future,2' Portland is the largest city in Oregon, and so faces unique
problems implementing the plan. Accordingly, "Metro" was granted
the power to implement the goals of Section 197.005 and others ar-
ticulated by the statewide planning commission for the three-county
metropolitan area of Portland. Immediately, the district established
an urban growth boundary, setting an outer spatial limit on growth. 3
B. Practical and Political Impacts of the Urban Growth Boundary
Since the 1970s, these growth boundaries in Oregon, particularly
in Portland, have shoehorned a burgeoning population into an ever
17 See DREIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 59-60 (discussing the factors which contributed to the
immense growth in suburban sprawl in the mid-1950s).
1 See Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs Talk to Each Other-and Often
Agree, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 11, 24 (1997) ("Most of the federal money [for the proposed
freeway] was transferred to build a successful fifteen-mile light-rail line from downtown to the
eastern suburb of Gresham.").
19 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.005(4) (2005).
20 See Some Interesting Referendums, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1976, at E18 (discussing the "disturb-
ing possibility that Oregon voters will undo their state's excellent land-use planning law").
21 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 197.010(1) (a) (2005) ("In order to assure the highest possible
level of liveability in Oregon, it is necessary to provide for properly prepared and coordinated
comprehensive plans for cities and counties, regional areas and the state as a whole. These
comprehensive plans... [m]ust be adopted by the appropriate governing body at the local and
state levels....").
2 The Portland area had dabbled in regional governance since as early as 1925. See Carl
Abbott & Margery Post Abbott, A History of Metro: Historical Development of the Metropolitan Service
District (May 1991), http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=2937. The article leads
with the question "How old is Metro?" and its first six sections discuss the various precursors to
the official regional government that was constituted in 1979. Although the freeway contro-
versy provides context for the creation of Metro in this Comment, it did not directly bring about
Metro's creation. Rather, both of these events appear to be symptoms of ongoing efforts in the
Portland area to grow responsibly.
23 See Metro: Timeline and History, http://www.metro-region.org/article.cfm?ArticleID=2935
(outlining the progress of Metro as an organization).
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more densely populated tract of land.24 However, as the area has be-
come more crowded, not all of Oregon's current residents have con-
tinued to support the long-standing restrictions. The allure of devel-
oping areas tantalizingly close to the city center is tremendous.
To be sure, many Oregonians are convinced by arguments for
"smart growth. '5  However, there is a classic and strong counter-
current of arguments in support of private property rights onto which
the opponents of the urban growth boundary latch. The opponents
emphasize property rights, freedom of choice, and the market econ-
omy as they label the state's planning goals as interventionist and an
unwelcome moralizing affront to individual freedom. At a basic level,
critics maintain that property restrictions allow the government to ef-
fectuate social engineering without compensating landowners for the
benefits that they impart to the rest of society.26 The specific instruc-
tion to local governments in Oregon is to "demonstrate that
its... regional plan provides sufficient buildable lands within the ur-
ban growth boundary... to accommodate estimated housing needs
for 20 years., 27 Some feel that Oregon governments effectuate a tak-
ing in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
28
when they pursue the statutory directive.
24 See Daniel Brook, How the West Was Lost, LEGAL AFF. Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 44, 45-46 ("[0] ur
total metropolitan footprint is about half of what it would be in another metropolitan area of
similar population.").
25 See CFM RESEARCH, OREGON LAND USE STATEWIDE SURVEY: A REPORT FOR OREGON
BUSINESS ASSOCIATION AND INSTITUTE OF PORTLAND METROPOLITAN STUDIES, TOULAN SCHOOL
OF URBAN STUDIES AND PLANNING, PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 20 (Mar. 2005) (delivering sta-
tistics that fifty-nine percent of those voting for Measure 37 still found it crucial for Oregon to
.protect[] land for the future needs").
26 What these benefits are is often debated. Critics of sprawl generally cite Portland as a lo-
cality where the common pattern of economic segregation and a depressed ring of neighbor-
hoods surrounding the central city area, often found in big cities with expansive suburbs, has
not taken hold. See DREIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 61 (identifying Portland and Minneapolis as
examples of successful regional governance and cooperation); see also DAVID RUSK, CITIES
WITHOUT SUBURBS 85 (1993) (discussing the potential for regional governance to stabilize the
ill effects of sprawl).
OR. REV. STAT. § 197.296(2) (2005); see also GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE
REGULATED LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 39-42, 51-53
(1992) (discussing the requirement that Oregon cities plan for growth).
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."). The seminal work on what "just compensation" truly means is Frank I.
Michelman's article entitled Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Generally, Michelman posits that we
should examine takings from a utilitarian perspective and realize that the demoralization and
settlement costs may outweigh the economic gain of a taking. Under this rubric he concludes
that we are incapable of compensating for particularly capricious and demoralizing redistribu-
tions. See id. at 1213-14 (discussing the costs and benefits of takings). Michelman's article
seems less instructive for regulatory takings than physical takings, since it seems that the demor-
alizing capacity of a regulation of exclusion is far less than uprooting an individual or family.
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The debate over whether this claim is true surfaces, in part, be-
cause of the economics at stake: with large sums of money hanging
in the balance, proponents of "smart growth" seek to use every legal
tool to open the area for development. Oregon's development poli-
cies favor maintaining green space outside the city limits over maxi-
mizing individual landowner profit.29  Thus, property restrictions °
forbid millions of dollars worth of development on the outskirts of
the city and in those portions of the nearby Columbia River Gorge
that would not otherwise be federally protected. 3 Land value at the
divide between urban and rural is high, particularly where people
hope to gain more "elbow room" after housing supplies are increased
through in-fill because the growth policies prevent them from spread-
ing outward 2
C. Measure 37's Response to the Urban Growth Debate
Backers of Measure 37 sought to end the restrictions on develop-
ment. "If housing supplies cannot accommodate demand," they im-
plored voters, "why should landowners just outside the city bounda-
ries be artificially prevented from responding to that demand,
especially if they've owned their property since before the govern-
ment came along and restricted their use of the land."
Within that framework, the law seems to presuppose that by enact-
ing or enforcing land-use policies, the government withdraws rights
previously vested in the property owner. Conceptually, the law ap-
pears premised on a myopic interpretation of the general principle in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.33 That case set forth a
See generally Brook, supra note 24 (discussing selective expansion of the Portland Urban
Growth Boundary to include some farms, but not the farm of one woman who had planted a
large number of trees on her property).
30 Zoning is hardly the only input contributing to density. See, e.g., Michael Lewyn, How
Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even in a City Without Zoning), 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1177-91
(2004) (discussing the role that building codes play in affecting land development patterns in
Houston, an area with no zoning restrictions at all).
31 See Blaine Harden, Anti-Sprawl Laws, Property Rights Collide in Oregon, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
2005, at Al (discussing a 210-acre parcel which is worth $8,000 an acre with farmland restric-
tions, but which is estimated to be worth $284,000 an acre if it could be converted into an 800-
house development).
32 Abbott, supra note 18, at 33 ("The mid-1990s have brought a rising awareness within the
city of Portland that increased density will consume existing local open space and vacant land.
With thousands of new housing units inside the city limits, many residents fear that there will be
no breathing space, no rest for the eye.... [Suburban parks] are great for hikers, mountain
bikers, and weekend excursions. They are less useful for inner-neighborhood kids and summer
youth programs."). But see The 2006 Men's Journal 50 Best Places To Live, MEN'SJ., Apr. 2006, at
54-55 (naming Portland the top city in the "Best of the Best" category and noting that
"[clompared to West Coast cousins Seattle and San Francisco, Portland is an out-and-out bar-
gain").
33 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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standard requiring governmental compensation of landowners for
regulatory takings that adversely impact "investment-backed expecta-
tions."" The Oregon statute reads:
(1) If a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use regulation or
enforces a land use regulation enacted prior to December 2, 2004, that
restricts the use of private real property or any interest therein and has
the effect of reducing the fair market value of the property, or any inter-
est therein, then the owner of the property shall be paid just compensa-
tion.
(2) Just compensation shall be equal to the reduction in the fair
market value of the affected property interest resulting from enactment
or enforcement of the land use regulation as of the date the owner
35makes written demand for compensation under this section .
The law gives landowners who owned their property prior to the im-
position of land-use restrictions the right to petition for compensa-
tion. This right remains intact for family members (defined to in-
clude corporate entities owned by family members) of those who
owned the land at the time of the imposition of growth restrictions.36
Thus, the law appears to deal a devastating blow to the continued
implementation of Oregon's growth policies.
The law's rhetoric is fascinating: it presumptively considers every
diminution of land value caused by a state regulation to be an uncon-
stitutional taking, necessitating compensation or exemption. In fact,
as this Comment will explain, these measures are simply constitu-
tional regulatory restrictions on property use. Conversely, legislative
abandonment of these restrictions is constitutional. Constitutionally,
Oregon can take either approach; the Constitution, however, cannot
resolve the normative question of what the government should do.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OREGON'S CHANGING LAND-USE
REGULATIONS
The law of takings originates in the Fifth Amendment prohibition
of taking "private property.., for public use, without just compensa-
tion."38 Oregon's land-use policies are the type of public use subject
to the Fifth Amendment. The state removes some of the bundle of
rights from some property owners by prohibiting certain uses of their
land. This section explains that Oregon's land-use laws-both before
and after Measure 37's passage-did not and do not impair the con-
M Id. at 124.
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.352(1)-(2) (2005).
36 Id. § 197.352(11) (A) (outlining the definition of"family member").
37 See generally Felicity Barringer, Property Rights Law May Alter Oregon Landscape, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2004, at Al (explaining how Measure 37 may impact growth regulation).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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stitutional rights of landowners by restricting their development ac-
tivities.
A. Doctrinal Foundation of Takings Law
As an initial matter, the Takings Clause's original meaning appar-
ently referred exclusively to physical takings. ' ° It is only more recently
that takings law has been expanded to encompass some categories of
non-physical takings.
1. Lucas and the Penn Central Balancing Test
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Councit' saw the Supreme Court or-
der compensation at the margin for landowners denied "all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of land."' 2 But that case also
In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Supreme Court found one Oregon land
use restriction unconstitutional. As part of its efforts to comply with ORS Chapter 197, see supra
note 21, the City of Tigard required a business owner to dedicate a portion of her land as a pe-
destrian thoroughfare as a condition to the construction of a new store on her property, 512
U.S. at 377-80. Somewhat famously, the Supreme Court struck down this requirement. Despite
its apparent relevance to this Comment, Dolan relies more broadly on the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine than on Takings Clause doctrine. Therefore, the case is set aside for the
remainder of this Comment.
My constitutional analysis builds upon Professor Michael Lewyn's analysis of the same
topic. See generally Michael Lewyn, Sprawl, Growth Boundaries and the Rehnquist Court, 2002 UTAH
L. REv. 1 (discussing the constitutionality of Oregon's land-use laws). Extensive review is neces-
sary in light of the current litigation in Oregon concerning Measure 37. Lewyn, in short, con-
cludes that urban growth boundaries in Oregon are probably constitutional as they are not total
takings and also because they rarely interfere with landowners' investment-backed expectations.
Id. at 51-52. However, his analysis had no reason to contemplate the current reciprocal prob-
lem of investment-backed expectations in light of an effort to sloppily and partially effectuate
an abolition of land-use legislation. Unpacking and developing his analysis will help this author
create a rubric under which to analyze the current constitutional controversy.
40 See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782, 782 (1995). Treanor goes on to discuss an 1888 critique
which objected to the importance that courts placed on physical property, protesting that "[wie
must.., look beyond the thing itself, beyond the mere corporeal object, for the true idea of
property." Id. at 799 (quotingJOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES § 59, at 54 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1888)); see also Harry N. Scheiber, The "Tak-
ings" Clause and the Ffifh Amendment: Original Intent and Significance in American Legal Development,
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 233, 242 (Eugene
W. Hickock, Jr. ed., 1991) ("[C]ourts... narrowed drastically the very concept of a 'com-
pensable taking' so as to exclude altogether nearly all forms of consequential, incidental, or
indirect damages."); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of
the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1100-01 (2000) (refuting the notion that modern
regulatory takings case law reflects original intent and asserting that "[m]any land use laws of
the founding era imposed severe economic burdens, yet compensation for such losses was never
paid"). But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that a state's
bar on all economically beneficial use of property is a taking).
41 505 U.S. 1003.
42 Id. at 1015.
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featured an extensive debate about the historical foundation of the
decision.
Justice Blackmun's dissent laid out a historical account of regula-
tory takings and argued that no purely regulatory takings had ever
been compensable. However, the majority opinion explained that
while Americans' experience may have been contrary to the Lucas
Court's current reading of the Takings Clause, that experience was
itself "out of accord with any plausible reading of [the Takings
Clause]." 44 Accordingly, the Court held that a regulation that strips
property of all economic value is compensable. Lucas built on prior
rulings that compensation was required where restrictions on the
manufacture of intoxicating beverages45 and the mining of coal46 de-
stroyed value for property owners; it defined the law for the extreme
case and stated that such a case would give rise to a claim for com-
pensation.
Substantively, Lucas adopted the balancing test from Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City.4 7 That test is used to "determin[e]
whether a land use regulation is intrusive enough to constitute a 'tak-
ing' . . . ., The test scrutinizes the degree to which a regulation is
intrusive by examining whether significant economic harm is caused,
the degree to which this economic harm affects reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the extent to which the regulation
"adjust[s] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.,
49
2. Historical Supreme Court Approaches to Zoning Restrictions
The Supreme Court has historically deferred to municipalities en-
acting zoning laws, perhaps acknowledging the previously discussed
disjunction between originalist and current understandings of regula-
tory takings.5" Twice in the 1920s, the Supreme Court refused to or-
43 Id. at 1057 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause origi-
nally did not extend to regulations of property, whatever the effect.").
44 Id. at 1028 n.15 (majority opinion).
45 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 674 (1887). Mugleris also important because it extends
the Takings Clause to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 665.
46 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
47 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (introducing a test to determine when a land-use regulation be-
comes a taking).
48 Lewyn, supra note 39, at 9. This test, as Professor Lewyn expounds, has been recently af-
firmed and clarified by Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), in which the Court ex-
plained that Lucas acts as an exception to the Penn Central balancing test, which does not need
be applied in cases of complete denial of economically beneficial or productive uses of a plain-
tiff's land. Lewyn, supra note 39, at 9 n.60.
49 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
50 That is, recognizing that municipalities historically had no limits on the regulations they
could enact without the action being considered a taking.
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der cities to rezone areas merely because the landowners could garner
greater economic benefit if zoned differently.51 In Zahn v. Board of
Public Works, the Court emphasized that "[t]he Common Council of
the city ... concluded that the public welfare would be promoted by
constituting the area [with restrictions on private commercial devel-
opment] .... 52 The Court has since emphatically reiterated that the
desire of a landowner to use property differently from how it is zoned
is not sufficient to force a government to rezone that land. Thus,
the Court recognizes both zoning and development restrictions to be
acceptable government regulations that do not venture into the tak-
ings category.
Even more recently, the Supreme Court reinforced this line of
cases, concluding that a municipal zoning ordinance intended to
promote open spaces was not a taking. In Agins v. City of Tiburon
5 4
landowners purchased undeveloped land. The land was subsequently
zoned to prohibit the erection of more than five single-family homes
on the five-acre tract of land.55 Citing Penn Central, the Court ruled
that this rezoning could not be a taking because it did not deny a
landowner all economically viable use of land.56
Further, the Court also reasoned that the ordinance advanced le-
gitimate state interests. 7 This latter construction is particularly in-
structive as the Court stated that the ordinance was valid because it
advanced a governmental purpose. This extended the "police power"
58to the goal of preserving open space. Advancing this strain of ar-
gument, the Court stated: "[t]he specific zoning regulations at issue
are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents of
51 Zahn v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927); Village of Euclid v, Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926). Scholars have noted that governments are not profit-
maximizing firms. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 279, 288 n.33 (1992) (discussing the economics of the Takings Clause).
52 Zahn, 274 U.S. at 328.
53 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976) ("It is hornbook
law that '[m] ere diminution of market value or interference with the property owner's personal
plans and desires relative to his property is insufficient to invalidate a zoning ordinance or to
entitle him to a variance or rezoning."' (quoting 8 EUGENE McQuILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 25.44, at 143 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2000))).
54 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
5 Id. at 257.
56 Id. at 260 ("Although the ordinances limit development, they [do not] prevent the best
use of appellants' land ...
57 Id. at 261.
58 See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1 (2006) (discussing in greater
depth the constitutional and policy considerations involved in urban planning and the police
power).
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Tiburon from the ill effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes
long have been recognized as legitimate."'59
Finally, Professor Michael Lewyn has observed that Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, when read in light of Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
develops by exclusion the idea of what is a total taking.6° He con-
cludes that the case stands for the proposition that "a regulation al-
lowing a landowner to build one house on eighteen acres of land is
not such a 'total' taking."6 For example, under this analysis a total
taking would not be found in a common situation around Portland:
land regulated by ordinance to farm use, even though it would be
more economically beneficial to its owner if developed into a new
housing subdivision.
B. Substantive Due Process Implications of Takings Law: A Path (Arguably)
Taken but (Unquestionably) Abandoned
The case law relevant to the constitutionality of Measure 37 is not
limited to those cases dealing specifically with takings. The specific
constitutional property rights issues raised by the parties to the Meas-
ure 37 litigation requires a due process analysis as well. In fact, Pro-
fessor Lawrence Berger has presented a compelling argument that
takings analyses have actually been couched in substantive due proc-
ess terms since Penn CentraL.
Professor Berger claimed that Mugler v. Kansas, an 1887 Supreme
Court case, foreshadowed the evolution of takings law into a substan-
63tive due process analysis. He noted that the Court warned potential
litigants that it would not accept at face value a government's claim
that a regulation had strong relationship to public ends; rather, they
would look to the "substance of things."6 Berger accordingly linked
Mugler to the dreaded "Lochner-izing" and followed this strain of ar-
gument through Pennsylvania Coal, Village of Euclid, and Agins.65 He
ultimately concluded that takings would be found only where the




Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added).
Lewyn, supra note 39, at 16.
61 Id.
62 See generally Lawrence Berger, Public Use, Substantive Due Process and Takings-An Integra-
tion, 74 NEB. L. REV. 843 (1995) (positing that the Supreme Court has unnecessarily intertwined
takings and substantive due process rules on several occasions).
63 Id. at 847.
Id. at 847-48 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887)).
See id. at 848, 856-57, 863-67 (summarizing cases where a substantive due process inquiry
was incorporated into a takings analysis).
6 Id. at 883-85.
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court rejected Berger's interpre-
tation. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 67 the Court clarified the field,
emphatically stating:
Although a number of our takings precedents have recited the "substan-
tially advances" formula minted in Agins, this is our first opportunity to
consider its validity as a freestanding takings test. We conclude that this
formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a tak-
ings, test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence. 68
The Court held that the inquiry should instead be centered around
"the magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes
upon private property rights... [and] how [the] regulatory burden
is distributed among property owners. ' '69 The Court reasoned that a
taking is equally onerous to two property owners, one of whom is
burdened by an ineffective regulation and one burdened by an effec-
tive regulation. 70  The Court emphasized that the Takings Clause,
when it mandates compensation, presupposes that a taking was for a
proper governmental purpose. 71 The Court in Lingle instead sup-
ported the Takings Clause jurisprudence of First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles72 and Armstrong v.
United States.73 The relevant inquiry is thus whether the burden to the
property owner is appropriate, not whether the burden is an accept-
able consequence given what the government is attempting to ac-
complish through the regulation creating the burden. Notably, how-
ever, the Court did not reject the result of Agins, and empathized
with its reliance on the language of Village of Euclid and Nectow v.
Cambridge.74  Thus, it is the method and explanation-but not the
outcome-of Agins that is no longer good law. "
67 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
68 Id. at 540.
69 Id. at 542.
70 See id. at 543 (explaining that the "substantially advances" test is not an appropriate tak-
ings test because it places too much emphasis on the effectiveness of the regulation at issue).
71 Id.
72 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987) (holding that the Takings Clause merely places conditions
on takings rather than prohibiting them and secures compensation in the event of such a tak-
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding that the Takings Clause demands compensation for those
who are burdened by a taking when justice demands that the general public should bear the
burden); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543 (relying on relevant precedent to explain why the "sub-
stantially advances" test is distinct from the inquiry into whether a regulation effects a taking).
74 See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541 ("When viewed in historical context, the Court's reliance [in
Agins] on Nectow and Euclid is understandable.").
A recent student comment posits that Oregon voters were inclined to pass Measure 37
due, reportedly, to arbitrary and inconsistent rulings which reject the Penn Central balancing test
and rely only on the Lucas standard of a denial of all economically viable use. Sara C. Galvan,
Comment, Gone Too Far: Oregon's Measure 37 and the Perils of Over-Regulating Land Use, 23 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 587, 594-95 (2005); see also Edward J. Sullivan, Reviewing the Reviewer: The Impact of
the Land Use Board of Appeals on the Oregon Land Use Program, 1979-1999, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REv.
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Additionally, in Lingle the Court noted that Tahoe-Sierra Preserva-
tion Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,76 a recent case thatS 77
had also relied on Agins, had done so only in dicta. The Tahoe case
represents a stronger argument in support of the constitutionality of
zoning restrictions-as it involved a temporary moratorium on all
building-than does Agins, which involved a permanent restriction
on some types of building. The implications of these two cases will be
examined in the next section.
C. Application and Implications to Pre-Measure 3 7 Law
The reviewed case law clarifies and updates the constitutionality of
urban growth boundaries in general. Urban growth boundaries, par-
ticularly as Oregon has constituted them, are constitutional. The
Oregon laws restricting development are part of a cohesive plan to
gradually develop the region. They place limited burdens on land-
owners that do not remove all value from the land. Accordingly, they
appear unassailable on constitutional grounds.
Professor Lewyn provided impeccable reasoning in this area as
well.7 ' He noted that Oregon landowners outside of urban growth
boundaries are substantially less encumbered in their use of property
than were the landowners in Palazzolo, and, therefore, cannot be con-
strued as victims of a total taking under Lucas.79 The conclusion ap-
pears the same under the Penn Central balancing test. Citing the
longstanding nature of Oregon's urban growth boundaries, Professor
Lewyn posited that it would be a rare case where there were in fact
441, 441 (2000) (analyzing the pattern of land-use decisions under Oregon planning laws).
While this was a political analysis, had the Court not rejected the due process theory of takings,
this analysis could theoretically have supported claims about the constitutionality of the urban
growth boundary.
76 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002) (holding that a temporary moratorium on building surrounding
Lake Tahoe was not a compensable taking because it did not dispossess the owner or affect the
owner's right to exclude others). Interestingly, now-Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., argued
the case before the Court in favor of respondents-that is, presenting the prevailing argument
that the restriction was valid. Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in the
case, arguing that the regulation should be considered a taking because of the indeterminacy of
the moratorium on building. Id. at 343-44 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Thomas and
Scaliajoined ChiefJustice Rehnquist in a 6-3 split of the Court.
7 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
78 Professor Lewyn did not address the substantive due process analysis of Professor Berger,
which I found compelling. In light of the Court's 2005 ruling that undercut much of Professor
Berger's analysis, any debate over the relevance of this reasoning to Professor Lewyn's article
became moot. However, given the constitutional reasoning employed by the Oregon court in
rejecting Measure 37, the analytical framework of Professor Berger was essential for my analysis.
See MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., No. 00C15769, slip op. at 22 (Or. Ct. App. Oct. 14,
2005), http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/macpherson--.opinion.pdf.
79 Lewyn, supra note 39, at 17-18 (reasoning that if the restrictions at issue in Palazzolo were
not a total taking under Lucas, then the restrictions in Oregon could not be construed as such).
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any investment-backed expectations to impair." Oregon's compensa-
tion law ostensibly applies only to those who have owned their land
before the regulation was imposed.
This conclusion is tenuous, though, because it groups those who
inherited land with original owners. The measure's supporters claim
that both sub-categories had a portion of their bundle of property
rights taken away with the land-use regulations of the 1970s. How-
ever, even if we presume that a taking occurred, we can update Pro-
fessor Lewyn's line of reasoning with Tahoe to show that even the re-
strictions against landowners and those in direct line of inheritance
are constitutional. Tahoe upheld a restriction on pre-existing prop-
erty rights that placed a moratorium on building in a specified area.
Thus, Tahoe prevents the Oregon landowners to whom Measure 37
would apply from escaping the rubric of Penn Central. This supports
the conclusion that the state can constitutionally impose zoning re-
strictions on any land so long as the restriction comports with the
Penn Central balancing test and does not strip land of all economic
value.
D. Application and Implications of the Post-Measure 37 Regime
Thus far, this Comment has analyzed the constitutional standing
of potential Measure 37 claimants vis-A-vis the land restrictions as they
stood prior to the approval of the measure in 2004. The tenor of the
argument changed with Measure 37: instead of the constitutional
deference toward the power of the state to enact regulations for the
public good, the analysis shifted such that in order to enact any fur-
ther land-use planning laws in the future, litigation would no longer
center on whether the zoning law passes constitutional muster under
Penn Central and its progeny. Rather, the state must litigate the issue
of whether the zoning law diminishes the value of a parcel of property at all
in order to avoid paying compensation to the landowner. This effec-
tively eliminates the category of noncompensable regulatory takings
in Oregon. 2
80 See id. at 20 (noting that because urban growth boundaries have existed for over two dec-
ades in Oregon, it is unlikely that they would frustrate the investment-backed expectations of
landowners).
81 Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 341-43 (rejecting petitioners' facial challenge to a moratorium on
building, in part, because the moratorium was unlikely to single out individual landowners and
because its duration was reasonable).
82 This conclusion is tempered by the Oregon Attorney General's interpretation of the new
law. See Letter from Stephanie Striffler, Special Counsel to the Att'y Gen. of Or., to Lane
Shetterly, Dir., Or. Dep't of Land Conservation and Dev. 2 (Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://
www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/m37dojadvice.pdf. The letter states in relevant part:
In other words, before deciding to grant relief to a Measure 37 claimant, a public entity
must determine at least that:
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The necessity of such takings has been categorically recognized
3
by the Supreme Court: "Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and
most of them impact property values in some tangential way-often
in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few govern-
ments could afford."s4 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that
"[g] overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. 's5 To deny a government the ability to en-
act regulations is to call into question the fundamentals of the social
contract between property owner and government. To take the
analysis back several layers, governments are instituted to provide se-
curity to property rights which would otherwise be precarious in a
state of nature. In return for the added security, property owners
give up some of their rights to the property. As the quote from the
Supreme Court indicates, it would be absurd for the property owner
to use the mechanisms of government to renegotiate this social con-
tract and insist on no government diminution of his property rights.
But this is precisely what Measure 37 purports to do.
So, as a policy matter, the compensation scheme that the Oregon
law installs is absurdly libertarian by the Supreme Court's standard.
Even the conservative Justices dissented in Tahoe because they con-
sidered the taking at issue in Tahoe a total taking. 6 They argued that
the land-use regulation went too far for a lack of compensation to be
justifiable. Thus, it seems that Measure 37 is really a bare policy and
political enactment, not an initiative required to remedy any per-
ceived wrongs under the Federal Constitution.
But does the new law run afoul of the Federal Constitution?
Those contesting the statute insist that it does. They agree with the
analysis that Oregon's smart growth policies are constitutional (and
* the claimant acquired the affect property before the law in question was adopted;
* the law restricts the use of the property in question;
" the law reduces the fair market value of the property in question;
" the law is not one that regulates activities that are commonly and historically recog-
nized as a public nuisance;
* the law is not one that protects public health and safety; and
* the law is not required to comply with federal law.
Id.
83 See generally Anthony Edward Falcone, Law and Limits: How Categories Construct Constitu-
tional Meaning, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1005 (2006) (discussing the judicial process of articulating
norms through categorization).
84 Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 324.
85 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
86 See Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 355-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (opining that the moratoriums
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which the measure's backers disagree with). But one of their avenues
of complaint is to reason that to remove the smart growth scheme
would violate the Constitution.
In February 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court struck down Judge
James's opinion."' They only very briefly discussed Judge James's rea-
soning, and flatly concluded that she was wrong. 89 I agree, and fur-
ther develop the conclusion that there is nothing constitutionally in-
firm about the law. However, the sections that follow develop the
intricacies and ironies of Judge James's constitutional analysis. I ex-
plain how and why she was wrong legally, but right from a policy
standpoint. Regardless of its constitutionality, Measure 37 is foolish
policy that reverses Oregon's historically intelligent commitment to
combatting sprawl. It enthrones a policy likely to depress home val-
ues and to erode many of the regional amenities that helped gener-
ate the very impetus for landowners to want to develop land outside
of urban growth boundaries.
IV. THE MARION CIRCUIT COURT APPROACH
The Marion Circuit Court opinion concluded that the new law was
unconstitutional, and, by implication, that the old law was constitu-
tional. This section summarizes and analyzes those since-overruled
holdings.
A. Synopsis of the Court Opinion
On October 24, 2005, Judge Mary Merten James ruled on cross-
motions for summary judgment in the Marion County Circuit Court.
The plaintiffs in the case included Hector MacPherson, 90 president of
Bannockburn Farms, Inc., as well as several other farm and property
owners, and 1000 Friends of Oregon, a nonprofit organization which
opposed Measure 37 when it went before voters in the November
2004 election. The plaintiffs each made distinct claims, and Judge
James examined each to establish their standing.
David T. Adams, one of the farmers, owned land adjacent to a
landowner subject to the measure's exemptions. Adams's neighbor
88 MacPherson v. Dep't of Admin. Servs., 130 P.3d 308, 322 (Or. 2006).
9 Id. at 321 (claiming the lower court erred because her conclusions were based on faulty
underlying conclusions).
90 Hector Macpherson is a third-generation dairy farmer who has been cultivating farmland
since World War II. Since the 1960s, Macpherson has been active in state land-use planning,
and was a state senator for several decades. He was active in pushing through the 1973 land-use
restrictions. See American Planning Association, Former Oregon State Senator Receives National
Planning Award, Mar. 17, 1999, http://www.planning.org/newsreleases/1999/ftp0317.htm (of-
fering a brief biography of MacPherson).
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had successfully applied for the exemption and was taking "steps to
subdivide his land, by clear-cutting and bulldozing the
land... [which] ... destroyed a wildlife corridor and adversely af-
fects the watershed." 9' Another neighbor could potentially do the
same thing. As a result, Adams claimed, the amount and quality of
water that would be accessible to his land would suffer. He also as-
serted that the roads around his home would "see increased traffic,
causing ... increased noise, pollution, risk of accidents, and the po-
tential that emergency services will be delayed. 9 2 Additionally, Ad-
ams predicted that " [t] he educational system will be further strained,
which will result in the shifting of tax monies from other programs to
schools, or to increased taxes.""' Even if the development were not
allowed to proceed, Adams asserted, the claimants would have to be
compensated and those monies would "be drawn from tax revenues
paid by Adams that would otherwise be used to provide services that
would benefit him.,
94
Additional plaintiffs made claims based on the incompatibility of.... 95
residential development adjacent to their farm use, decreased land
value,99 potential for new residents on subdivisions complaining about
frequent farming-related noise,97 and general harmfulness to the
business model of farming.99
Judge James concluded that landowners adjacent to property be-
ing developed under zoning waivers granted by the new law had
standing to sue. She did not immediately conclude that plaintiffs
whose land was not adjacent to land that had been granted an ex-
emption had standing, however. Nonetheless, she indicated the
analysis must include the tax consequences of any refusal to grant ex-
emptions, and therefore she extended standing to all plaintiffs.99
Judge James then analyzed the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. In attempting to do judicially what they could not politi-
cally, the plaintiffs included claims that Measure 37 was:
1) impairing the legislative body's plenary power,
2) violating the Oregon Constitution's equal privileges and immunities
provision,
3) violating the Oregon Constitution's provisions on suspension of laws,




94 Id. (citation omitted).
95 Id. at 4.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 5-6.
99 Id. at 8.
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4) violating provisions on sovereign immunity,
5) impairing free speech,
6) compensating religious institutions,
7) violating separation of powers,
8) impairing federal constitutional procedural due process, and
9) impairing federal constitutional substantive due process.100
The first claim asserted was that Measure 37 impairs the legisla-
ture, by preventing the legislature from enacting zoning regulations
without compensating landowners.' Judge James agreed and found
that by placing limitations on the legislature's ability to use its power
to regulate, the measure has prohibited the body from exercising its
"plenary power."' '  Relying on Supreme Court decisions in NorthernI .. . . 104
Pacific Railway Co. v. Duluth°3 and Stone v. Mississippi, which both
stand for the proposition that states could not make deals with private
organizations that limited their police power, Judge James concluded
that "if Measure 37 prohibits the legislative body from exercising its
plenary power to regulate for public welfare, health, or safety, it is an
unconstitutional curtailment of legislative power."' '5  Judge James
then noted that Measure 37 would require the government to "pay to
govern."°6 The government, she said, could not constitutionally be
"forced to choose between exercising its plenary power.., or paying
private parties to comply with the law."' James went on to distin-
guish Measure 37 from other legislation having a fiscal impact and
found constitutional significance in the need to expend funds only
after laws had been passed and only when the legislature actually at-
tempted to enforce them (i.e., when landowners would not be per-
mitted to build on lands zoned as outside an urban rowth bound-
ary). 108 On that basis, Judge James struck down the law.
100 The second claim (violation of Oregon Constitution privileges and immunities) was ac-
cepted by Judge James, who agreed that the measure gave one group of property owners rights
not afforded to other property owners. Id. at 14-15. The third claim (violation of Oregon Con-
stitution suspension of laws provisions) was also accepted in part because the zoning laws would
be suspended for some landowners but not for others. Id. at 16. The fourth claim (sovereign
immunity) was rejected, and the fifth claim (Oregon state freedom of speech) was ruled not
justiciable. Id. at 16-17. The sixth claim (compensation to religious institutions) and seventh
claim (separation of powers) were also dismissed. Id. at 18-19.
101 Id. at 10.
102 Id. at 11.
103 208 U.S. 583, 598 (1908) (voiding a contract that limited police powers on public policy
grounds).
1 101 U.S. 814, 817-18 (1879) (explaining that the legislature cannot curtail its own police
power).
105 MacPherson, No. 00C15769, slip op. at 11.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 11-12.
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Next, the procedural due process claim was predicated on the in-
ability of those affected by land-use decisions reached under Measure
37 to have safeguards allowing them notice and an opportunity to be
heard before the decisions were made. 1 ' JudgeJames noted:
The serious and imminent risk of an erroneous deprivation of prop-
erty interests that are impacted by a government entity's decision on a
Measure 37 claim, and the fact that a predeprivation hearing, with notice
and the opportunity of property owners near the Measure 37 claimants'
land to be heard could prevent the improvident exemption or nonappli-
cation of land use rules, obligates governments to provide property own-
ers near a Measure 37 claimant's property with notice and the opportu-
nity to be heard before the public entity decides the claim.... [N]either
the Measure nor the regulation afford the property owner any modicum
of relief.... Measure 37 does not permit any discretion to deny a waiver
request (excepting to pay the landowner to comply with the law, which
governments are financially unable to do.) Thus, at the very least, the
procedural due process right of Adams [the plaintiff whose neighbor had
already begun developing his land pursuant to a Measure 37-generated
waiver] has been violated because the procedural protections are inade-
quate if they exist at all."'
Thus, Judge James concluded that on federal procedural due process
grounds Measure 37 could not survive.
Next, Judge James turned to the federal substantive due process
issues. The plaintiffs urged that Measure 37 "does not serve a legiti-
mate state interest and, in any event, the valuation scheme for com-
pensation... has no rational relationship to the state's interest. "11
The adjoining landowners' interest, which would diminish in value if
their neighbors were allowed to develop their own property, entitled
them to the protection of substantive due process provisions. Judge
James conceded that a deferential standard of review would apply in
analyzing whether the government could have had a legitimate rea-
son for acting as it did when analyzing whether the plaintiffs were en-
titled to the protection of the courts. Employing her earlier conclu-
sion that Measure 37 unconstitutionally impaired the state's plenary
power, Judge James reasoned that "the government, through the ini-
tiative process, could not have had a legitimate reason for enacting
Measure 37, because, as described earlier, the compensation provi-
sion of Measure 37 impedes the exercise of the plenary power. As
such, Measure 37 violates plaintiffs' substantive due process rights."
' 3
109 Id. at 12 ("Because Measure 37 currently imposes limitations on government's exercise of
plenary power to regulate land use in Oregon, it is unconstitutional.").
110 Id. at 21.
ill Id.
112 Id. at 22.
113 Id.
[Vol. 9:2
Jan. 2007] CONSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL STRUGGLE 615
B. Constitutional Assessment of the Court's Opinion
The Oregon Supreme Court eventually overturned the circuit
court's ruling that Measure 37 was unconstitutional, but it is fascinat-
ing to understand how and why the reasoning was deficient. As
noted earlier in this Comment, Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law."" 4 The Oregon
measure, the court concluded, prevents the government from using
this regulatory power. Judge James cited two lesser-known cases in
support of the need for governments to exercise their police pow-
ers. T1 However, those cases differed in significant ways from the
situation in this case: Holmes was analyzing new legislation. In con-
trast, James addressed modifications to the legal standard of interfer-
ence a taking must meet in order for relief to be mandated. That, in
and of itself, is less significant than the corollary on which much of
Judge James's reasoning rests: she accepted the plaintiffs' argument
that the consequences of the exemptions (or payouts) would affect
their property rights sufficiently that their due process rights would be
implicated. So, the plaintiffs in this case were pointing at other citi-
zens and saying that the way the government was handling its interac-
tions with those citizens (and which facially had nothing to do with
the plaintiffs) impaired the due process rights of the plaintiffs.
Ironically, their analysis failed to account for the foundation that
makes the Oregon urban growth boundaries constitutional in the
first place. Judge James was correct to accept the premise of the
plaintiff's argument that their property rights were intertwined with
those of the landowners that gained development rights under Meas-
ure 37. However, to correctly understand the constitutional implica-
tions of the law it is necessary to understand that whether urban
growth boundaries in general impair constitutional rights and
whether Measure 37 (a law removing an urban growth boundary)
impairs constitutional rights are not analytically distinct analyses.
Both represent different forms of diminution of value.
The operation of Measure 37-removing the secondary protec-
tion that a landowner gets from the restrictions his neighbor is sub-
ject to-is identical to a regulatory taking. It is a quasi-legislative de-
cision' 6 that alters land-use regulations and affects land values. This
114 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
11 See generally N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583 (1908); Stone v. Miss., 101 U.S. 814
(1879). Both cases contain references to the fact that the government cannot contractually
limit its ability to perform actions in exercise of its police power.
16 As previously discussed, this was enacted through the Oregon initiative process.
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form of regulation-exempting for cause specific plots of land-
should clearly be analyzed under the same regulatory takings scheme
of analysis. UnderJudge James's formulation, the essence of Measure
37's constitutional infirmity was that it authorized the government to
allow individuals to develop their land in a way that adversely affected
neighboring land.
V. WHY THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE SECONDARY AND FRAME THE
QUESTION INCORRECTLY
The constitutional law claims were the initial foil for opponents of
the Measure 37 regime. However, since they failed, it is appropriate
to step back and understand the structure of the regulatory regime.
It is through this lens that this Comment reaches its conclusion that
the pre-Measure 37 regime was ideal from a policy-if not from a
constitutional-point of view.
A. Property, Liability, and Inalienability Rules: Law and Economics and the
Functioning of the Land-Use Restrictions"7
This section argues that the ultimate failure of attempts to over-
turn Measure 37 as unconstitutional does not categorically mean that
future attempts to avoid the granting of exemptions will fail."8 A
constitutional infirmity was a worthwhile initial attempt at a sweeping
solution. That failing, background rules exist and offer piecemeal
protections for smart growth policies.
The controversy surrounding Measure 37 and urban growth
boundaries can be better understood by examining it through the le-
gal and economic framework that Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed presented in 1972, building upon the work of Ronald
Coase." 9 Their article helps illustrate that the constitutional argu-
ment is not the only way to approach this topic. Instead there are
additional civil law claims that pursue the same goals.
17 This section borrows from and builds upon a paper written for a course in legal theory
taught by Professor Claire Finkelstein, with guest lectures by Professor Leo Katz, in Spring 2005.
While the thoughts and application to this topic are original, I am unquestionably indebted to
Professors Finkelstein and Katz for guiding my exploration of the topic.
118 Difficulties associated with administering the claim system may result in legislative
modification in January 2007. See Laura Oppenheimer, -Rood of Claims Soaks State with Land-Use
Worries, OREGONIAN, Dec. 5, 2006, at Al (describing the practical problem of adminstering a
high number of claims).
19 See generally Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (introducing a legal model
for analyzing entitlements).
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1. The Foundation of Coase
Coase popularized the theory of property rules. He suggested
that rights should be treated as commodities to be bought and sold
rather than the government protecting existing entitlements. His
preference for such rules was premised on the claim that government
action in protection of property rights was less efficient than having
property rules in place. Coase argued that it was foolish to view an
expansion of governmental regulation as the solution to property
rights dilemmas. 20 Rather than heavily regulating, Coase argued that
governments should (at most) simply grant entitlements."' He wrote
that, in a world with no transaction costs, property rights would en-
sure that entitlements move to their most highly valued locations, re-
gardless of their initial allocation. In contrast with clumsy govern-
mental assignment through intervention, under an entitlement-based
system, whoever valued the right more would purchase it from the
other party.
Coase also suggested that Pigou's claim that property rights were
best protected by government action was illogical.2 2 He considered it
foolish to first attribute any success in the regulation of entitlement
to government involvement, but then, second, to bemoan that the
system was far from ideal and ask what additional government action
would improve things. Coase reasoned that if governmental action
was not producing the desired results, more governmental actions
could not be the solution.1 23 Accordingly, Coase shifted the paradigm
by asking what would happen if, instead, the government took no ac-
tion, allowing individuals to negotiate a solution.
As an example, Coase hypothesized about two parties, a farmer
and a rancher, living side by side. Not being very neighborly, the
rancher's cattle trample the farmer's crops. Under Pigou's scheme,
the government would step in and force the rancher to realize the
full economic consequences (externalities) of his decision to raise
cattle by forcing him to compensate the farmer for the crop loss.
Coase found this inefficient, that is, if court interactions were the
only way to resolve such an issue, then each season the farmer would
12 See RONALD COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 95,
135-40 (1988) (proposing an alternative solution to government-made solutions to property
usage disputes).
1 See id. at 97-114 (describing in greater detail Coase's proposed limited role of govern-
ment in individual property rights).
122 For further explanation of Piqou's claim, see ARTHUR C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 127-30 (4th ed. 1932).
123 SeeCOASE, supra note 120, at 135.
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plant the crops, content to profit either by harvesting and selling or
by watching the crops get trampled and then suing.
12 4
In a world with no transaction costs, Coase posited that there was
no need to have such inefficiencies. If the state uses a property rule
to protect the ability to grow crops in the area the cattle habitually
trampled, then the property right can be exchanged. If the right to
use the land is more valuable to another party, then a property rule
would unobtrusively allow the rancher to buy the rights to the land
and leave it barren to avoid waste.
Coase demonstrated that the goal of society should not be to
eliminate crop-trampling (or pollution for that matter) outright.
Rather, it should be to interfere minimally and encourage property
owners to reach rational solutions given mutually exclusive uses of
the land. Coase demonstrated that there are often situations where
one party will profit a certain amount from the damage he inflicts on
the other party. Without transaction costs, nothing prevents actors
from discovering precisely where the good is most valued and ex-
changing property rights in a way that makes both parties better off.
If the state wants to affect distribution (acknowledging that transac-
tion costs do exist) then that work should be done in the initial allo-
cation of the entitlement, rather than with later regulation.
2. Calabresi and Melamed
Calabresi and Melamed expanded on this analysis and articulated
categories of rules that can be used to understand adversarial intra-
party interactions where entitlements are present: property rules, li-
ability rules, and inalienability rules. 126 Each category associates with
property ownership different types of rights. The authors noted that
in some situations transaction costs may be too high to allow the eco-
nomic fluidity on which Coase's theories rely.
Calebresi and Melamed accepted Coase's assertions but developed
them for more practical applications. Coase had been forthright that
his ideas only applied when there were no transaction costs.
Calabresi and Melamed fleshed out how they thought Coase's ideas
translated into a world with transaction costs. 12 7 They observed that
because markets never perform perfectly, in many situations other so-
lutions function better than property rules to reach efficient and dis-
tributionally sound results.
124 Id. at 144-49.
125 Id. at 97.
126 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 119, at 1089 (discussing the benefits of integrating legal
relationships that are commonly studied in separate subject areas).
127 See id. at 1093 (noting the potential importance of administrative efficiency and transac-
tion costs).
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One alternative, liability rules, involves price fixing, wherein peo-
ple are compelled to enter into transactions where transaction costs
might otherwise have prevented efficient market function. 28 Instead
of a free market negotiation over the price of an entitlement, the
government sets the price. Liability rules are especially valuable
where there are too many actors and so an efficient solution cannot
be reached. Calabresi and Melamed considered such rules to be
closely tied to property rules, but as a distinct class that is required to
reach economically efficient results because of the shortcomings of
particular markets. This conceptualization was important for how it
diverged from Coase, observing that in some situations, the most
economically efficient results can actually be reached through some-
thing other than property rules. This defeats the holdout problem:
if the owner of one of ten plots of land knows that her plot of land is
essential to a project then she might try to get an artificially large
amount for her land, knowing that a large project cannot go forward
until she consents to the sale. If the group is buying, one may have
the free-rider problem: some may refuse to contribute, knowing that
they cannot be barred from later enjoying the benefits of the pur-
chase. These difficulties prevent some markets from yielding the
"preferred" outcome.
Liability rules also exist and yield more efficient results in situa-
tions like auto accidents, where any negotiation would take place af-
ter the "transaction." With a system of liability rules, the state can set
the price for specific goods when the market cannot do so efficiently.
In such a system, if one's entitlement is invaded, then the invader of
that entitlement is required to compensate the injured party.
Calabresi and Melamed also explained that in addition to enhanc-
ing efficiency, liability rules promote a favorable distribution of enti-
tlements. They gave the example of a factory employing poor work-
ers stationed close to a wealthy residential neighborhood. The
factory uses cheap coal and could eliminate the offensive pollution by
using higher quality coal. Calabresi and Melamed observed that tra-
ditionally one only thinks of three ways of addressing the conflicting
desires to pollute and be free from pollution. They involve either the
factory or the homes having a property right to use the land as they
wish, or for the homes to have a liability rule protecting them from
pollution. Calabresi and Melamed observed that, in reality, giving
the homes the right to be free from pollution unless they agree to sell
that right would likely drive the factory out of business. This may be
economically efficient, but the factory workers are harmed when the
factory is put out of business. Forcing the factory to pay a set amount
128 Id. at 1106.
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to continue polluting could likewise put the factory out of business.
A property rule for the factory could result in the workers keeping
their jobs, but it could be inefficient because of the previously men-
tioned collective action problems.
129
Calabresi and Melamed articulated another solution: protect the
factory's right to pollute by a liability rule. This way, if the homeown-
ers wish to stop the pollution, they are assessed an amount that would
compensate the factory for switching to more expensive, cleaner coal.
This way of selecting the initial entitlement and the rule that protects
it would be the only way to produce both favorable distribution and
efficiency results.
130
All this said, liability rules should not always be used. Calabresi
and Melamed clarified specific situations where they may appropri-
ately be used, but Coase's essential point-that property rules should
probably be used more-was not disturbed. Once a liability rule is
introduced it interferes with the free market and prevents the market
from determining where resources go. Parties may value their enti-
tlements more highly than the state accounts for in price fixing be-
cause market transactions are the only way for market value to truly
be determined-value is really shorthand for expressed value.
Calabresi and Melamed do not dispute these problems; they simply
explain situations where liability rules are economically justified in
the presence of transaction costs.
1 31
The third category, which is highly relevant in comparing the tac-
tics of parties in the Measure 37 litigation, are inalienability rules.
Such rules prohibit the transfer of certain entitlements, removing
them from the market. These rules are classified in Calabresi and
Melamed's article as "moralism [s] .,,13 Calabresi and Melamed identi-
fied two situations that prompt use of inalienability rules: first, where
a transaction creates too many externalities, and, second, where the
externalities would be difficult or impossible to calculate. 134 They de-
picted inalienability rules as a more extreme version of the reasons
for moving from property to liability rules.
Calabresi and Melamed suggested two efficiency-related justifica-
tions for inalienability rules. There can be self-paternalism where ac-
tors enter into restrictive pacts, like a bill of rights (thus saying that in
the future, although they may be tempted to impair certain rights,
they wish to prevent themselves from being able to rush to impair
129 Id. at 1121.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 1125 (acknowledging that their approach may not apply to many areas of the
law).
132 See id. at 1111 (discussing the application of inalienability rules to the pollution problem).
133 Id. at 1112.
134 Id. at 1111-12.
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those rights) .' There can also be true paternalism, which is based
on the idea that one part may know better than another party what
is best for the other party.
Inalienability rules actually represent alteration of the underlying
entitlement, and not everyone thinks that inalienability rules should
exist. In arguing for property rules in nearly every situation, Judge
Richard Posner rejected the notion that there are markets where in-
alienability rules properly displace property rules. With the caveat
that coerced contracts should be unenforceable, he was willing to al-
low a contract to provide forperson A's knees to be broken if he fails
to repay a loan to person B.' 3 Posner conceded that this position vio-
lates traditional notions of morality. 138 But he says that there is no
reason to assume that such a contract must have been coerced. He
would view such an agreement as wealth maximizing for those in-
volved. 1' 9
3. Oregon's Scheme
Measure 37's backers and the voters who approved now-Oregon
Revised Statutes Section 197.352 rejected Oregon's urban growth
boundaries, which were provided for by an inalienability rule. Such
boundaries establish a fixed point where no further growth can take
place, regardless of the political exigencies of the day. Properly con-
ceived, such a rule reflects the exorbitant transaction costs involved
in figuring out who should pay for sprawl as well as the public good
that is a well-planned city with such amorphous attractions as "quality
of life."' 40 The regulatory takings jurisprudence reflects a scheme that
accommodates this sort of governmental intrusion on the private
sphere. An urban growth boundary reflects the conclusion that the
cost of allowing unrestrained development is harmful to cities.
4' Ur-
ban growth boundaries prevent development outside of certain areas,
but as a corollary, they encourage growth within the "urban" bound-
ary. Measure 37 abandoned Oregon's choice from the 1970s to cre-
ate an inalienability rule vis-A-vis urban growth.
135 Id. at 1113.
136 Id. at 1113-14.
137 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
134-35 (1979).
38 Id. at 135-36.
"39 Id. at 134.
140 There are lingering questions as to whether inalienability rules are actually economically
justifiable.
141 This proposition was expounded before. The Metro regional government's mode of op-
eration is precisely to plan growth. A necessary part of planning growth is restricting growth at
some times in some places. See RUSK, supra note 26, at 85 (discussing the potential for regional
governance to stabilize the ill effects of sprawl).
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142
Now, a mix of property and liability governs. First, a liability
rule provides that the individual property owner is entitled to use his
land as he sees fit and that any action that impairs that right must re-. 143
sult in compensation. Under this rule the government makes a de-
termination of whether the application of its urban growth boundary
to the landowner's parcel is worth the amount that must be paid. If
not, the restriction is lifted.'4 Second, if the government lifts the re-
striction, typical property rights and rules are operative. 45 Property
owners, if they wish to prevent their neighbors from building, can
purchase the property development rights, just as Coase suggested
would happen.
To clarify, the constitutional analysis set forth earlier in this Com-
ment illustrated that the inalienability rule of urban growth bounda-
ries in Oregon was constitutional. Judge James concluded that alter-
ing the scheme-abandoning the inalienability rule framework-
constituted a taking from those who had relied on and/or were cur-
rently benefiting from the scheme. I argued, however, that there was
no inalienability rule preventing the removal of the protections of the
original inalienability rule. Removing the protections of the original
inalienability rule simply forces property owners to use the underly-
ing property and liability rules-which never disappeared and were
merely superseded-to prevent their neighbors from developing land
in a way that harms them.
There are two ways that this scheme affects value, which I previ-
ously claimed are not altogether analytically distinct. That is, the
claims are either related to increased tax burdens, which compensate
for continued regulation on neighboring land, or to direct diminu-
tion of value because of exemption-enabled development on
neighboring parcels. Each choice lowers land value by making the
142 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 119, at 1106-10 (arguing that both property and liability
rules are necessary within the context of eminent domain).
143 This is, of course, an atypical liability scheme. As discussed at length, the federal standard
is that the individual is entitled to compensation only if a total taking has been enacted.
144 That said, the fear of opponents of the measure is that cash-strapped local governments
will not have the wherewithal to compensate anyone.
As I will discuss in analyzing the policy implications, the inalienability scheme is most likely
more appropriate in this situation because this calculation does not account for the govern-
ment's essential role of preventing harm. If police officers had to pay an attorney's hourly rate
during a traffic stop, it would be absurd and would prevent traffic cops from carrying out their
essential function of ensuring vehicular safety. That the government has to show that it can pay
the appropriate price to be the government is absurd.
145 There is nothing in the statute to indicate that development would in any way be ex-
empted from common law rules regarding property. Thus, the claims of the plaintiffs in
MacPherson v. Department of Administrative Services, No. 00C15769 (Or. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2005),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/LCD/docs/measure37/macpherson-opinion.pdf, would
be ripe for a common law suit regardless of their bearing on the constitutional question.
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property subject to a greater amount of state or local tax or to nui-
sance.
But this is self-defeating for any regulatory takings claim advanced
by landowners whose neighbors are attempting to develop. If the
government is attempting on average to maximize property values,
the choice of whether to compensate under Measure 37 or to exempt
would be one of economics. The choice under the scheme is be-
tween reducing property values by increasing taxes or reducing prop-
erty values by increasing congestion, pollution, and sprawl in the vi-
cinity.146  Assuming the government makes the economically
advantageous choice, property values will on average decrease less
under the chosen approach to a Measure 37 claim. In any case, the
reduction in land value can never be a 100% reduction and, accord-
ingly, the regulatory takings claims would fail. Thus, as previously
discussed, urban growth boundaries are legitimate precisely because of
the regulatory takings framework that holds that only complete tak-
ings are compensable.
B. Policy Arguments and Practical Concerns Indicating that Inalienability
Rules are Appropriate in this Circumstance
However, to step back, I assert that from a policy perspective-
viewed now through the lens of inalienability rules-the original de-
cision to create urban growth boundaries was the correct one, and it
seems rash for Oregon voters to have so dramatically altered the de-
velopment landscape for the future. It is true thatJudge James's rul-
ing came to erroneous constitutional conclusions and is likely an in-
appropriate exercise of judicial power. The Oregon Supreme Court
was correct to overturn her decision on constitutional grounds.
However, as a matter of policy, the most appropriate course of action
for Oregon and other states seeking to avoid sprawl is to plan for the
future by limiting space for development. From a policy perspective,
urban growth boundaries are appropriate uses of inalienability rules.
They capture public goods that property and liability rules are inca-
pable of adequately accommodating. Thus, Measure 37 appears to
be bad policy, whatever its constitutional standing.
The chief reason why urban growth boundaries are good policy is
that they reduce sprawl. The normative characteristics of reducing
sprawl are complicated. Much of the analysis is beyond the scope of
this work. The basic framework, though, is presented here.
146 Given two identical houses (save for the amount of taxes to be paid each year), the one
requiring more expenditure will be valued less. Likewise, if the hypothetical is altered with an-
other pair of houses, one will confront a more undesirable environment.
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
One scholar has identified ten traits of suburban development
that critics refer to as "sprawl":
(1) unlimited outward extension, (2) low-density residential and com-
mercial settlements, (3) leapfrog development, (4) fragmentation of
powers over land use among many small localities, (5) dominance of
transportation by private automotive vehicles, (6) no centralized plan-
ning or control of land uses, (7) widespread strip commercial develop-
ment, (8) great fiscal disparities among localities, (9) segregation of types
of land uses in different zones, and (10) reliance mainly on the trickle-
down or filtering process to provide housing to low-income house-
holds.
14 7
Thus, not all suburban growth is necessarily sprawl. Sprawl, as I use
the term, is the failure of growth to proceed in a manner consistent
with the notion of the city as a public space. Cities are inherently
communal ventures, created by a social contract. So, existentially, cit-
ies are areas where private citizens converge.1
4
8
Some proponents of suburbia argue that sprawl is not problem-
atic. Earlier this decade, one author wrote that he did not think that
there was a single instance of sprawl under a definition similar to the149
one referenced. This author insisted that suburban areas all pro-
vide these amenities to its citizens and recited statistics and praised
the virtues of allowing citizens to follow through with their prefer-
ences for suburban living. 150 But this account does not respond to the
problem that suburbs benefit from proximity to cities and absorb
positive externalities. The author asks the wrong question. We
should not ask if suburbs are bad for the people who live there. In-
stead, we should scrutinize whether they are bad for the metropolitan
region. Suburbanites would likely concede that they derive benefit
from their proximity to cities."' However, they are less likely to con-
147 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, supra note 7, at 504 (citing Anthony Downs, The Costs of
Sprawl-And Alternative Forms of Growth, Speech at the Center for Transportation Studies Research
(1998), http://wwwl.umn.edu/cts/trg/adowns.html).
148 See generally RiCHARD DILwoRTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY 11-35
(2005) (explaining the benefits bestowed on private citizens who live in cities).
149 Clint Bolick, Subverting the American Dream: Government Dictated "Smart Growth" is Unwise
and Unconstitutional, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 860 (2000) (questioning whether sprawl, as defined
by the Sierra Club, actually exists). The Sierra Club's definition of sprawl, as quoted by Bolick,
is "low-density development beyond the edge of service and employment, which separates
where people live from where they shop, work, recreate, and educate-thus requiring cars to
move between zones." Id. (citing Sierra Club, What is Sprawl?, http://www.sierraclub.org/
sprawl/report98/what.hmtl (last visited Nov. 16, 1999)).
150 See id. at 860-65 (arguing that the opinions underlying opposition to suburban sprawl are
largely unfounded).
151 Not the least of these benefits is access to infrastructure, which enable growth in the first
place. See DILWORTH, supra note 148, at 36 (discussing the pattern of infrastructural develop-
ment in New York beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century and examining the
extent to which suburbs benefited from the urban areas).
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cede that the inverse is true: cities absorb negative externalities from
suburban sprawl. 52 The recognition of this fact directs us towards a
policy preference for smart growth and the potential conclusion that
Calabresi and Melamed's inalienability rules are an advantageous so-
lution to problems of urban policy.
Sprawl amplifies the problem of ex-urban areas drawing resources
from cities without shouldering the true costs of those resources.
The rapid expansion of infrastructure puts strain on cities. Some
commentators claim that this expansion is a free market expression
of preferences by those who live in the suburbs.' 53 However, there are
several convincing explanations for movement to the suburbs that
question this assertion. National transportation policy has been to
heavily subsidize the development of freeways, and to tax gasoline at a
much lower rate than other nations do.
National overdependence on oil has been noted by several diverse
sources. 54  Because national transportation policy has historically
pursued certain goals, it is now a political challenge to reverse course.
However, the claim that suburban growth is a free-market expression
of preferences raises questions of whether this is a cause or effect of
national transportation policy. 
55
Development in the suburbs decreases the ability of cities to de-
velop comprehensive methods of mass transit. Low density suburbs
cannot support efficient mass transit. Automobile transportation be-
comes the only available way to get from place to place, which clogs
the roads, and increases the amount of time spent going to and from
work. The social and psychological effects of this situation have been
noted. Cities must foot the bill for the roads that allow people toleav ther .156
leave their boundaries. In scrambling to reduce traffic, they reflex-
ively expand road capacity, which fuels the problem, coaxing more
people into suburbia. As noted earlier, Oregon pursued a different
path in the 1970s, funneling money into mass transit rather than
their freeway system. The light-rail system built with these funds has
152 Suburbs are by definition an extension of a specific metropolitan area, but something dis-
tinct from it as well. This seems to define a parasitic relationship: a partner only for the bene-
fits that can be derived from the city, but bearing no responsibility for the ills.
153 See generally Bolick, supra note 149, at 860-66 (noting that a cornerstone of Americanism is
the freedom to choose where one lives).
154 Most notably, President Bush made reference to an addiction to oil in his 2006 State of
the Union Address. State of the Union, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 141, 150 (Feb. 6, 2006)
("America is addicted to oil... [and] [t]he best way to break this addiction is through technol-
ogy.").
155 See DREIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 103 (discussing the "arranged marriage with the auto-
mobile" in America).
156 Portland, of course, diverted federal freeway funding. See supra Part II.A.
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been systematically expanded since it first opened in the 1980s.
l
5
Thus, even as it restricted the rate of suburban growth, Portland has
been able to ensure more mass-transit options for those who live in
the outskirts of the metropolitan area, ensuring an efficient means
for citizens to commute.
There are other harms of sprawl as well. It reduces the account-
ability of citizens to their fellow citizens. To avoid paying for social
services to the needy, citizens can move away from the problems. Re-
gional governance has been noted for its capacity to limit the effi-
ciency of such relocation.15 By defining what is urban and rural,
Oregon policy was able to better ensure that the citizens could not, in
effect, shoplift the benefits of cities without having to pay for the costs
of the city.
One author scoffed at the notion that suburbs are capable of re-
placing cities:
It may seem odd to argue that place matters when technology ap-
pears to have conquered space. Americans are highly mobile. Cars and
planes have made it possible for us to travel more quickly than ever be-
fore. Telephones, computers, cable networks, and, above all, the Inter-
net enable us to engage many aspects of society without leaving our
homes.... E-Commerce makes it hardly necessary to drive to the mall
anymore. Every day, more people work at home instead of commuting to
the office.... Cities, some argue, are becoming obsolete.
In fact, this idea is nonsense. As places of intense personal interac-
tion, cities are as important as ever. If technology were truly abolishing
space and time, real estate values would flatten out.... [Rather,] over 80
percent of all of Americans have chosen to live in metropolitan areas, not
the countryside.
159
Indeed, the fact that land values are high in "rural" areas in Ore-
gon underscores that it is desirable to live near cities, but not neces-
sarily to live in them (which would require paying for the benefits
generated by the city).160 Under Tiebout's analysis, this implies that
157 TriMet, A History of Public Transportation in Portland, http://trimet.org/about/
history/transitinportland.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006).
158 See Mark Allen Hughes, Let Philadelphia Go, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 25, 2000, reprinted in
GREATER PHILA. REGIONAL REv., Fall 2003, at 4, 5-7 (discussing how a fragmentation of the city
of Philadelphia would decrease the ability of suburbs to avoid paying for positive externalities
they receive from the city); see also Robert P. Inman, Should Philadelphia's Suburbs Help Their Cen-
tral City, 2003 Bus. REv. 24, 32-34 (discussing how cities and suburbs may be able to benefit
from using a regional economic model rather than a city-based model).
159 DREIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 3-4.
160 By this I mean the development value of the rural land. The rural land is more valuable
insofar as it could be used to build more housing. In recent years, cities generally have begun
to return to vogue. See PAUL C. BROPHY & JENNIFER S. VEY, BROOKINGS INST., SEIZING CITY
ASSETS: TEN STEPS TO URBAN LAND REFORM 1 (2002) (noting a recent increased interest in re-
siding and working in cities); see also RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND
How IT'S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 243-48 (2002) (dis-
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Oregon cities have positioned themselves well in the competitive
economy of intercity competition for residents, and that success in
fact created the economic pressures that generated intense support
from some landowners for Measure 37's passage.161
One of the main effects of sprawl is economic segregation. "It is
hard to say exactly how much the demand for suburban housing
represents 'flight from blight' instead of a simple matter of taste for
housing further out.' 62  However, by reducing the ease with which
one can geographically flee from "blight," it becomes possible to sup-
port any counter-blight efforts. If policymakers discourage growth
outside urban growth boundaries, it facilitates gentrification. Such a
policy better acknowledges that land is finite. 163 Ultimately, social and
environmental concerns underscore that land use should not be per-
ceived as an exclusively private venture.
64
For all of these reasons, I close with reference to Frank Michel-
man's thoughts from 1978 on how we can reconcile our desires for
private property interests with the public good position I have advo-
cated as a policy matter. He discussed how market failure can take
place when citizens are paralyzed by collective action problems and
fail to provide services that they would all prefer to receive. 65 To ad-
vocate against the operation of the free market in this instance is not
to argue against the free market's general operation. Rather, in a
free market, property and liability rules neither force sprawl areas to
compensate the metropolitan region for positive externalities nor pay
for their own negative externalities:
The idea is to view government as one of two great sub-systems-the pri-
vate market is the other-which together are supposed to achieve an
individualistically optimal allocation of resources. Individuals come to
market, so to speak, each with her or his own current endowment of
preferences, abilities, and property claims.... Under behavioristic indi-
cussing the well-functioning city as a place where professionals converge and the importance of
the city's ability to attract such people).
161 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20
(1956) (discussing consumer consumption patterns and the factors that influence a consumer's
decision to settle in a particular community).
162 DREIERETAL., supra note 12, at 91.
16 To be sure, gentrification is not without some difficulties. First, it is a slow process. Much
of the attraction of a brand new subdivision is that when the housing stock is first being sold,
there is no crime: it is a new neighborhood and so there are no existing residents to perpetrate
crimes. This is a tremendous attraction. Gentrification, by contrast, involves existing housing
stock and necessarily is a gradual process. Second, it displaces existing residents.
1I leave discussion of the environmental concerns, which I suspect are many, to other au-
thors who can better support assertions that sprawl harms the environment. To put it suc-
cinctly, the increased presence of asphalt, cars, and building on larger and larger tracts of land
comes at the cost of green space and necessarily impacts the ecosystem.
1 Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. LJ. 145, 155 (1978).
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vidualism, efficient resource allocation has for certain occurred only
when all costs are borne, and all benefits enjoyed, by those who choose to
produce them or have them produced. The virtue of a free market is the
tendency it generates toward this state where externalities are all "inter-
nalized" by voluntary exchange transactions. Yet markets can sometimes fail
to realize the optimum condition of complete internalization. Such failure is as-
sociated with unusual difficulty (high transaction costs) in striking a bar-
gain or [through collective action problems]. 66
Because of the vast array of externalities, inalienability rules are best
suited to the reconciliation of private and public needs insofar as
metropolitan planning is concerned. These specific policy concerns
illustrate some of the many reasons why it is difficult to understand
the true costs are of an unorganized frenzy of suburban growth.
VI. CONCLUSION
The framework under which land-use rules are developed has last-
ing impact. That framework directly impacts the development of our
cities, for better or worse. Oregon presents a compelling case-study
for the social forces that can result in a restrictive land-use regime
characterized by urban growth boundaries. Such boundaries, al-
though they may be considered unfair to existing landowners, are
constitutional. Under the Constitution, only total deprivation of
economic use requires compensation. An urban growth boundary
does not restrict landowners so completely.
In 2004, Oregon voters approved Measure 37. The resulting law
required governments to compensate landowners for the loss of their
land's value. Many Oregonians comfortable with the restrictive land-
use regulations cried foul, claiming that opening up certain land for
development would impair their own investment-backed expecta-
tions. However, incident to the conclusion that urban growth
boundaries are constitutional is the inescapable corollary that aban-
doning such boundaries does not result in a taking.
Instead of looking to the Constitution to validate their objections,
proponents and opponents of urban growth boundaries should rely
on existing schemes of property, liability, and inalienability rules
when arguing for particular (de)regulatory schemes. As this Com-
ment demonstrates, there are many overriding policy considerations
that make the deregulation of Measure 37 questionable. Suburban
sprawl may sacrifice the livability of the entire metropolitan area and
inefficiently allocate costs and benefits to a region's residents. As a
result, a return to the inalienability regime of urban growth bounda-
ries, as it existed in 2004, may be the wisest choice.
1 Id. at 155 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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